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Scholarly Interest Report
John Bryant
Professor Emeritus
Professor Emeritus of Economics
  • Ph.D. (1975) Carnegie Mellon University (GSIA) Economics, Minor in Statistics Dissertation Committee: Allan Meltzer, Robert Lucas, Edward Prescott
  • B.A. High Honors in Economics (1969) Oberlin College
  • M.S. (1973) Carnegie Mellon University (GSIA)
Department Affiliations
  • Department of Economics
    Research Areas
     Economics, Bank Runs, Financial Fragility, Coordination-Failure and Strategic Uncertainty, Epistemology, Special Topics

    Bryant's "Stag Hunt" Coordination Game


    Faithfulness and Trust

    are important, and in some situations critical:

    “To focus the analysis consider the following tacit coordination game, which is a strategic form representation of John Bryant's (1983) Keynesian coordination game.” (VHBB, p. 235)  

    U(i) = A { minimum [e(1), ...,e(N)] } - B {e(i)},

     i = 1, ...,N; A > B> 0; 0 ≤ e(i) ≤E.

    (Symmetric, Summary Statistic)


    [Here there are N>1 individuals, labeled as individual 1 through N, and individual i is one particular one of those N individuals.  Each individual i chooses an "effort level" e(i) that is between 0 and E, E>0.  The payoff to individual i is called U(i) and is increasing in the minimum effort level chosen in the whole group of N individuals, and decreasing, but less strongly, in the individual's own effort.  Intuitively, this can be thought of as similar to a simple model of the individual payoffs to members of a "team."]

    [By the way, in Macroeconomics, Austrians can view this as elucidating a role of the entrepreneur while Keynesians a role of the government.] 

    {Also, for the somewhat more technically inclined, it may be worth noting that if you are going to model team production, where “moving together” beats “going it alone,” and if you are going to assume constant returns to scale and also want the technical convenience of continuity in “effort” (hence the continuum of equilibria) then, by Euler’s theorem, the payoff function must be non-differentiable, as with the “min rule:” that is, the no surplus condition (a condition of Walrasian equilibrium not met in team production) is not a mere technicality, consider also the more familiar Leontief production technology specification.  Notice further that as the number of players grows the "min rule" provides a “severe test of payoff dominance” (VHBB, p. 236), a feature completely missed by standard theory.}   

    "Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil's [experimental] results [VHBB] suggest that predictions from deductive theories of behavior should be treated with caution: even though Bryant's game is fairly simple, actual behavior does not correspond well with the predictions of any standard theory.  The results also suggest that coordination-failure models can give rise to complicated behavior and dynamics." (Romer, David, Advanced Macroeconomics, 2012)

     Van Huyck, John B., Raymond C. Battalio andRichard O. Beil, "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review 80, (1990) [VHBB].



    Financial Intermediation


    Journal of Economic Theory,
    Volume 149, January 2014, Special Issue "Financial Economics," Pages 1–14,

    Introduction to financial economics ☆
    Franklin Allen, Dimitri Vayanos, Xavier Vives

    "1. Introduction
    Financial economics is a broad field covering corporate finance, asset pricing, and financial intermediation. The foundations of modern corporate finance date back to the celebrated papers of Modigliani and Miller [1958] and [1961] and the development of agency theory starting with Jensen and Meckling [1976]. Asset pricing was revolutionized by the development of mean-variance analysis by Markowitz [1952] and the Capital Asset Pricing Model by Lintner [1965] and Sharpe [1964]. The theory of efficient markets by Samuelson [1965], the option pricing model of Black and Scholes [1973] and Merton [1973], and the role of asymmetric information in Grossman and Stiglitz [1980] followed. Financial intermediation theory lagged behind with the modern literature dating back to Bryant [1980], Diamond and Dybvig [1983] and Diamond [1984]."


    Bryant, John, "A Model of Reserves, Bank Runs, and Deposit Insurance," Journal of Banking and Finance 4, IV (1980).

    Teaching Areas
     Monetary Economics, Macroeconomics
    Selected Publications

    Bryant, John "Coordination , Fragility, High Powered Money and the Liquidity Trap: A 'Tobinesque' Parable." Symposium on Macroeconomic Coordination, 31(1) (Winter 2005)


    Bryant, John "Fiat Money and Coordination: A'Perverse" Coexistence of Private Notes and Fiat Money." Post Symposium on ContributionsIn Press


    Bryant, John "Coordination, Fragility, High Powered Money and the Liquidity Trap: A 'Tobinesque' Parable." Eastern Economic Journal (2004) In Press


    Bryant, John "Fiat Money and Coordination: A 'Perverse' Coexistence of Private Notes and Fiat Money." Eastern Economic Journal (2004) In Press


    Bryant, John "Coordination Fragility, high Powered Money and the Liquidity Trap: A 'Tobinesque' Parable, accepted as is,." Eastern Economic Journal (2003)


    Bryant, John "Book Review of "Coordination Games: Complementarities and Macroeconomics by Russell W. Cooper." Economica (forthcoming)


    Bryant, John "Coordination, Fragility, High Powered Money and the Liquidity Trap: A 'Tobinesque' Parable." under review, Eastern Economic Journal


    Bryant, John "Trade, Credit and Systemic Fragility." under review, Journal of Banking and Finance


    Russell W. Cooper "Coordination Games: Complementarities and Macroeconomics." Journal of Economic Literature 38 (March 2000)


    Russell W. Cooper "Coordination Games: Complementarities and Macroeconomics." Economica (forthcoming)


    Bryant, J. "Coordination, Credit and an Elastic Currency." Macroeconomic Dynamics, 1, No. 4 (1997)


    "Game Theory, Rationality, and Equilibrium Economics; Some Puzzles of Coordination: A Defense of Basic Program." Macroeconomic Coordination Faliures Conference, Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont. (May 5, 2001)


    "Technological Complementarity, Coordination and Monetary Fragility." Eastern Economic Association Annual Conference, Washington, D. C.. (March 2000)


    "Trade, Credit and Systemic Instability." Finance Workshop, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University, St. Louis. (October 2000)


    "Trade, Credit and Systemic Instability." Risk Management in the Global Economy Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and Journal of Banking and Finance, Chicago, IL. (September 2000)


    "Coordination, Liquidity and Recession." Midwest Macroeconomics Conference, Pittsburgh, PA. (April 10, 1999)


    "Money and Interest Rates with Endogenously Segmented Markets." Paper presented by Pat Kehoe, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, at the Texas Monetary Conference hosted by The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Dallas, Tx. Dr. Bryant was a participant and discussant, (April 24, 1999)


    "Trade, Credit and Systemic Instability." CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands. (June 29, 1999)


    "Liquidity and Recession." Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Atlanta, Georgia. (March 6, 1998)

    Awards, Prizes, & Fellowships
     International Educator of the Year Nominee, International Biographical Centre (2003)

     The Who's Who Award of Achievement, International Biographical Centre (2003)

     American Biography Nominee, American Biography Institute (2003)

     American Biographical Institute Hall of Fame, American Biographical Institute (2003)

     American Biography World Lifetime Achievement Award Nominee, American Biography Institute (2003)

     Outstanding Faculty Associate of Weiss College, Rice University (2003)